which there was no majority position whatsoever on the legal test. 7 That interregnum was followed by nineteen years during which three core equality concepts were adopted by a unanimous or majority court, only to be explicitly rejected in very short order. 8 These reversals were then situated within a new characterization of the relationship between sections 15(1) and 15(2) of the Charter, only to have the Court restore the original relationship a decade later. 9 With every section 15 case, the Court states the legal test for equality rights with a slightly different nuance, leaving litigators and scholars alike struggling to parse the significance, if any, of minute variations in wording. Despite strong analysis in the 2018 majority judgments, however, the jurisprudential restlessness threatens to continue as both appeals were decided by narrow margins 10 in which the majority and dissent again applied mutually incompatible understandings of the four basic equality concepts identified above.
This perpetual instability makes equality litigation extremely unpredictable. It also invites litigants to repeatedly contest section 15's core principles. The meaning of equality is thus always up for debate which undermines social discourse about and commitment to equality as a fundamental right. Two government-led legal processes in the immediate wake of Alliance and CSQ bear witness to this. Just five months after Alliance, a federal pay equity law was introduced 11 which included provisions negating legal principles that the SCC had just enunciated and which replicated provisions previously struck down as unconstitutional. 12 Meanwhile, in pay equity litigation, the Ontario Attorney General argued that reliance on the two SCC pay equity rulings was "misplaced and unhelpful" even though they addressed substantially the same legal issues that were at stake in Ontario. 13 The federal statute's failure to reflect current legal principles, and the extreme formalism of Ontario's radically narrow approach to constitutional precedent, both signal an abiding resistance to equality in practice. They raise serious grounds to question whether, in a period of intensifying political polarization, the federal and provincial governments have stopped engaging in the "Charter dialogue" when it comes to equality rights. 14 While Alliance marks one step forward in equality jurisprudence, these subsequent government actions may mark two steps backwards for women's equality rights in practice.
Part II of this paper provides an orientation to the socio-economic context of the gender pay gap, the elements of that gap which are targeted by pay equity, and the evolution of the right to equal pay for work of equal value that is enshrined in pay equity laws.
Part III provides an overview of Alliance and CSQ. The cases, respectively, address women's right to an enduring remedy for systemic sex discrimination and women's access to pay equity remedies in female-dominated workplaces. 
II -CONTEXT: THE GENDER PAY GAP IN CANADA 16
Systemic sex discrimination that suppresses women's pay has long been documented and condemned in Canada. As early as 1984, Rosalie Abella J.'s landmark Equality in Employment Royal Commission Report stated that the fact systemic sex discrimination lowers women's pay is "one of the few facts not in dispute in the 'equality'
15 Law v. Canada, supra note 7 at para. 2 16 While this paper follows the structure of pay equity legislation which speaks of discrimination between "female-" and "male-" dominated jobs, the author recognizes that gender is fluid and not confined to a rigid binary of female/male. Human rights statutes in every Canadian jurisdiction protect against discrimination based on gender identity and gender expression: see, for example, Canadian Human Rights Act, R. ; Ishani Nath, "For transgender women the pay gap is even wider", Macleans (February 8, 2018) online at: https://www.macleans.ca/society/fortransgender-women-the-pay-equity-gap-is-even-wider/ (accessed July 28, 2019). To date, however, pay equity analysis struggles to break out of the female/male binary because the sex discrimination that results in unequal pay has been driven by practices which, over centuries, have institutionalized the devaluation and marginalization of work done by those who identify as women based on norms and prescribed gender roles anchored in a female/male binary. Similarly, the statistical and socio-economic data which establish an evidence-based correlation between female-dominance of occupations and suppressed pay reflects that binary. Parallel in-depth and long-term research documenting similar correlations between occupations and suppressed pay on other grounds -including race, Indigeneity, disability, sexual orientation, gender identity and gender expression -has not yet been conducted, owing in large part to a lack of data that disaggregates statistics on these grounds. A critique of the limits of this analysis is beyond the scope of this paper but warrants further examination.
debate". 17 Yet, despite laws that have prohibited sex discrimination in pay for generations, a large and measurable systemic gender pay gap continues to impoverish women relative to men across the country and across the labour market.
Various metrics are used to measure the gender pay gap between women's and Canada's 2016 Census data 20 on women's and men's annual earnings reveal that on average, women across Canada earn 32% less than men. This gap is larger for women with disabilities (56%), immigrant women (55%), Indigenous women (45%) and racialized women (40%). The precise wage gap varies by province, 21 using the legal standard of "equal pay for work of equal value". "Pay equity" is the term of art which refers to this specific legal standard.
In 1951, the same year ILO Convention No. 100 was adopted, Ontario introduced the Female Employees Fair Remuneration Act -Canada's first statute to protect women's right to equal pay without discrimination based on sex. Between 1952 and 1975, the federal government and remaining provinces followed suit. These "first wave" equal pay guarantees -now incorporated into employment standards legislationprotect women's right to be paid the same as men doing substantially the same work.
The "second wave" of protections came as provincial and federal human rights statutes were adopted between 1962 and 1979. 36 Human rights laws give broad guarantees of equality in all aspects of employment from advertising for jobs, through recruitment, hiring, training, pay, benefits, promotions, harassment on the job, terminations, and discriminatory impacts of any other terms and conditions of work.
These two statutory frameworks had limited impact on closing the gender pay gap, however, because they require individual women to file complaints about their circumstances. Combatting systemic wage discrimination that permeates the labour market cannot be done effectively one woman, one case at a time. Thus, in 1986, five years after Canada acceded to CEDAW, provinces began introducing pay equity statutes which mandated employers to proactively deliver equal pay for work of equal value. 37
Women in Canada remain "concentrated in industries that parallel their traditional gender roles at more than double the rate of men"; within industries, "women and men tend to occupy distinct occupations, with women's typically being at lower levels than 35 See the history outlined in Alliance, supra note 1 at para. 6-11. 36 Territorial human rights codes were introduced later: Yukon (1987), North-West Territories (2002), Nunavut (2003). 37 Manitoba introduced Canada's first proactive pay equity legislation in 1986. In 1987, Ontario introduced the first proactive pay equity legislation that applied to both the public and private sector and in 1992 expanded the law to become the first pay equity statute that provided remedies for women who work in predominantly female workplaces in the broader public sector. In 1996, Quebec introduced the first statute that provided pay equity entitlements to women in female-dominated workplaces in both the public and private sector. men's"; and across industries women continue to work in occupations that parallel traditional gender roles of care work, education and service. 38 The proportion of women working in the twenty most female-dominated occupations in Canada has barely shifted in more than a generation, from 59.2% in 1987 to 56.1% in 2015. 39 Pay equity laws address the fact that sex segregation by occupation and workplace is accompanied by systemic devaluation of the work women do. As the Ontario Pay Equity Hearings
Tribunal summarized in one of Canada's foundational pay equity rulings:
Women are paid less because they are in women's jobs, and women's jobs are paid less because they are done by women. The reason is that women's workin fact, virtually anything done by womenis characterized as less valuable. In addition, the characteristics attributed to women are those our society values less. In the workplace, the reward (wage) is based on the characteristics the worker is perceived as bringing to the task. … The lower the value of those characteristics, the lower the associated wage. 40 Since 1987 the SCC has recognized that discrimination arises from the continued operation of systems that have been designed around the interests, values and experiences of groups with greater political, economic and social power and privilege.
Whether it is intentional or not, this systemic discrimination is frequently a product of continuing to do things 'the way they have always been done'. 41
Pay equity laws identify how these unspoken assumptions and practices operate and eliminate their discriminatory effects. They address the impact of the sex segregation of work by comparing the wages of women and men doing different jobs of similar value. Pay equity laws impose proactive obligations on employers that generally track these five steps: Step 1: Identify which jobs are female-dominated, male-dominated or neutral in that they do not reflect a gender predominance in present or historical incumbency or norms.
Step 2: Evaluate female-dominated and male-dominated jobs based on their skill, effort, responsibility and working conditions to determine, in a gender-neutral way, the value of all jobs to the employer.
Step 3:
Compare the total compensation of female-and male-dominated jobs of similar value.
Step 4: Adjust the total compensation of female-dominated jobs to close the pay gap where they are paid less than male-dominated jobs of similar value.
Step 5: Monitor compensation on an ongoing basis to ensure that as new jobs are created, old jobs disappear and duties of existing jobs change of over time, discriminatory devaluation of women's work is not revived. Where pay equity gaps re-emerge, employers must maintain pay equity by adjusting the pay of female-dominated jobs on an ongoing basis to close the pay equity gaps as they arise. 42
In unionized workplaces, pay equity statutes typically require that this process be conducted with active participation of the bargaining agent. In non-unionized workplaces, employers conduct the analysis to create a pay equity plan but workers must be given a period to review and challenge the employer's analysis.
Pay equity laws epitomize the active intervention that the SCC has recognized is necessary to "break a continuing cycle of systemic discrimination"; "to create a climate in which both negative practices and negative attitudes can be challenged"; and to "destroy those patterns in order to prevent the same type of discrimination in the future."
They are consistent with Canada's bedrock human rights principle that systemic discrimination requires systemic remedies. 43
III -THE QUEBEC PAY EQUITY APPEALS
Both 2018 pay equity appeals arose from challenges to Quebec's PEA. 44
CSQ: Pay Equity in Female-Dominated Workplaces
The legal challenge in CSQ was brought by unionized womenprimarily childcare workers and language interpretersworking in traditionally female-dominated occupations in deeply sex segregated industries. Their workplaces had no maledominated jobs. They argued that by imposing a multi-year delay and denial of a remedy for sex-based wage discrimination in female-dominated workplaces, the PEA violated their right to equality contrary to section 15.
The PEA was passed in 1996. Section 1 expressed the laws purpose as being to "redress differences in compensation due to the systemic gender discrimination suffered by persons who occupy positions in predominantly female job classes." Further, it stated that women working in female-dominated workplaces without male-dominated jobs have the right to pay equity using wage comparisons from outside their specific enterprise. section 15 violation because they held the differential treatment was based on "the lack of male comparators in their employers' enterprises," not sex. 55 Only McLachlin CJC found a section 15 violation that could not be justified under section 1. 56
Alliance: Employers' Duty to Maintain Pay Equity
Alliance addresses employers' duty to maintain pay equity after it is first that by allowing remedies only every five years and only on a go-forward basis, the PEA created periods during which identified discrimination was not rectified. Further, by excluding unions from the pay equity audits and denying access to the information and analysis on which the audit results were based, the PEA denied the ability to determine if the audits were valid.
The Quebec Superior Court and Quebec Court of Appeal both agreed that by prohibiting remedies for pay discrimination that emerged during the five years between audits and by prohibiting access to the audit information, the PEA violated section 15
and that violation was not justifiable under section 1. 62 Both Quebec courts ruled that the PEA did not discriminate based on sex by allowing employers to conduct pay equity audits without union involvement. 63 The Attorney General of Quebec appealed the decisions. The Unions cross-appealed the ruling on unions' exclusion from pay equity audits.
The SCC ruled 6-3 in favour of the claimants on the lack of remedy between audits and the denial of audit information. 64 They ruled, however, that the unions "have not …discharged their onus of proving that the lack of employee participation has a discriminatory impact in the circumstances of this case." 65 
IV -ONE STEP FORWARD: RECOGNIZING SYSTEMIC DISCRIMINATION

Confronting Privilege
Throughout its section 15 jurisprudence, the SCC has waxed rhapsodic over the Equality litigation is "difficult"or more accurately gives rise to feelings of discomfortprecisely because it confronts how law operates as the tool that institutionalizes power and privilege in society. 71 In judicial reasoning, the presumption of a law's constitutionality at times is conflated with an assumption of compliance with constitutional norms in practice. This erases the reality and dynamics of systemic discrimination and replaces them with the narrative that discrimination is aberrant rather than endemic: 72
Charter litigation … is premised on the notion that the baseline experience is one of constitutional compliance that delivers security and rights protection. The unspoken assumption is that an individual starts with an experience of rights protection and the impugned state action is an aberrant divergence from that presumed status of [constitutional] security. 73 From the outset, Charter equality jurisprudence has stressed that discrimination is primarily systemic. Yet, most Charter litigation has challenged isolated provisions in a single statute which may deny access to a specific benefit. These cases are overwhelmingly formal equality claims involving direct discrimination. 74 This repetition reinforces formal equality as the paradigmatic case, creating the impression that discrimination is narrow and isolated and that only minor adjustments are required to achieve equality. Only rare Charter claims have challenged the structural roots of systemic discrimination and those have met with mixed success. 75 and what is better characterized as conceptual dissonance or avoidance techniques that arise in legal reasoning.
Advancing a Substantive Equality Analysis of Systemic Discrimination
Justice Abella's majority reasons in Alliance and CSQ demonstrate that a rigorous substantive equality analysis that addresses the impact of systemic discrimination is possible. Her reasons mark an advance in substantive equality analysis and the role of section 15(2) of the Charter. They also make inroads in bringing a gendered lens to section 1 analysis that may open the way to activate section 28 of the Charter in constitutional analysis.
(a) Systemic Discrimination 77
Systemic discrimination refers to how power structures relationships between groups in society, privileging some and marginalizing others. 78 Within this power dynamic, dominant groups attach socially constructed meaning to human traitssuch as sexand have entrenched social systems and behaviours that institutionalize those traits as a basis on which to unequally distribute social, economic and political rights, material well-being, social inclusiveness and social participation. 79 As the SCC has observed, systemic discrimination institutionalizes practices that, through the imbalances of power, or the discourses of dominance, such as racism, ablebodyism and sexism, … result in a society being designed well for some and not for others. between actions (or inaction), attitudes and established organizational structures".
Claims "alleging gender-based systemic discrimination cannot be understood or assessed through a compartmentalized view"; instead they must be "understood, Significantly, understanding how sex discrimination operates systemically leads the majority to recognize that discrimination in pay "exists in the workforce whether or not there are male comparators in a particular workplace" and that "women in workplaces without male comparators may suffer more acutely from the effects of pay inequity precisely because of the absence of men in their workplaces." 86 and sex segregated workplaces in which female-dominated work is most devalued are the end products of the systemic devaluation of women's work.
As a result, the majority in CSQ easily identified that denying a pay equity remedy to women in female-dominated workplaces was based on sex. Access to a remedy was "expressly defined by the presence or absence of men in the workplace"
and women in female-dominated workplaces are "the group of women whose pay has, arguably, been most markedly impacted by their gender". 87 In the PEA, women's close proximity to male work determines whether they are entitled to a remedy for systemic sex discrimination. The more women have suffered from systemic sex discrimination that results in deeply sex-segregated occupations, sex-segregated workplaces, and undervaluing of women's work, the less they are entitled to remedies for systemic sex discrimination.
Similarly, understanding the dynamics of systemic discrimination enabled the majority in Alliance to recognize that systemic pay discrimination is not simply historical but operates on a continuing basis. 88 This lead the majority to recognize that the pay audit process that provided remedies only on a go-forward basis was discriminatory because it effectively granted an amnesty from equality compliance of up to five years.
As the Court noted, "this has the effect of making the employer's pay equity obligation an episodic, partial obligation." 89 But "the Charter right to equality is not episodic right that exists only at designated intervals but slumbers without effect between times". 90 It must be protected in a continuous, enduring way and remedies for its breach must be similarly seamless. Finally, in understanding systemic discrimination as an ongoing pattern of behavior, Abella J. recognized that denying access to the information underpinning pay equity audits was discriminatory because it undermines any air of reality to the promise of equality. Access to that information was a necessary 87 CSQ, supra note 4 at para. 29 88 operational precondition to verifying the audit and exercising any right to challenge its results.
The majority reasons, then, mark an advance because the reality of systemic discrimination is not merely observed once in passing but the systemic lens remains at the forefront, shaping the entire section 15 analysis.
(b) Section 15(2)
Section 15(2) of the Charter has bedeviled equality rights jurisprudence since the SCC's 2008 ruling in R. v. Kapp 91 . Before this, the jurisprudence treated section 15 (2) as an interpretive aid that supported the substantive equality interpretation of section 15(1) 92 . Section 15(2) "reinforce[d] the important insight" that in a social reality of systemic discrimination "substantive equality requires positive action to ameliorate the conditions of socially disadvantaged groups". 93 Kapp instead gave section 15(2) independent effect as a "defence" to allegations of discrimination: "if the government can demonstrate that an impugned program meets the criteria of s. 15(2), it may be unnecessary to conduct a s. 15(1) analysis at all." 94 Kapp provided shelter from full section 15 scrutiny if a government could demonstrate that the impugned law, program or activity has an ameliorative or remedial purpose and targets a disadvantaged group identified by enumerated or analogous grounds. Unlike the focus on effects that informs the rest of Canada's equality jurisprudence, 95 under section 15(2) the Court adopted an analysis focused exclusively on the government's intent such that the Court would ask if it was "rational for the state to conclude that the means chosen to reach its ameliorative goal would contribute to that purpose". 96 Kapp with the Court's longstanding dictum that
In interpreting and applying the Charter … the courts must be cautious to ensure that it does not simply become an instrument of better situated individuals to roll back legislation which has as its object the improvement of the condition of less advantaged persons. 102
The majority made clear that section 15(2) is not a "stand alone defence" for government "to any and all claims brought under s. 15(1)"; 103 it is a "defence" for those who are the beneficiaries of a special program that ameliorates systemic discrimination. 99 Andrews, supra note 4 at para. 37 100 CSQ, supra note 4 at para. 37; Alliance, supra note 1 at para. 30 101 CSQ, supra note 4 at para. 38; Alliance, supra note 1 at para. 31 102 R. v. Edwards Books and Art Ltd., [1986] 
(c) Bringing a Gender Lens to Section 1
Finally, Abella J.'s reasons in Alliance take small steps towards incorporating a gendered lens into assessing what is considered demonstrably justifiable in a free and democratic society. This is necessary to meet the Charter's commitment in section 28
that "the rights and freedoms referred to in it are guaranteed equally to male and female persons." Section 28 is significantly understudied 105 and has to date played a limited role in litigation. 106 The impact of bringing a gender lens to or omitting it from section 1 analysis is well illustrated by contrasting Alliance with Newfoundland (Treasury Board) v. NAPE 108 the last pay equity dispute that was heard by the SCC under the Charter.
Newfoundland (Treasury Board) v. NAPE examined provincial legislation that eliminated three years' worth of pay equity adjustments that were owed to public sector employees. The SCC found that eliminating the pay equity debt violated section 15, but then derailed vindication of their equality rights by reintroducing discriminatory norms under section 1. The section 1 ruling was based on judicial notice and what the Court acknowledged was a "casually introduced" record whose weakness would normally be of "serious concern". 109 Despite this, the Court accepted the government's assessment that a financial crisis justified eliminating the pay equity payments. The Court used disparaging language in equating a decision to pay the equality debt to "throw[ing]" other claims and priorities to the winds". 110 It cast doubt on whether meeting Charter equality obligations "must necessarily rank ahead of hospital beds or school rooms" without appreciating the irony that the women staffing the hospitals at issue were the very ones bringing the Charter claim. 111 Ultimately, the Court ruled that the effect on the women, while "deeply unfortunate" was "purely financial" and that it would merely "leave the women hospital workers with their traditionally lower wage scales for a further three years." 112 By contrast, in Alliance Abella J. definitively ruled that leaving discriminatory pay in place after it has been identified perpetuates systemic sex discrimination. 113 To normalize these practices is not purely financial but ideological in that it "makes women 'the economy's ordained shock absorbers'". 114 It also feeds rather than breaks the cycle of systemic discrimination because it
[r]einforces one of the key drivers of pay inequity: the power imbalance between employers and female workers. By tolerating employer decisionmaking that results in unfair pay for women, the legislature sends a message condoning that very power imbalance, further perpetuating disadvantage. 115
As Abella J. wrote in her 1984 Royal Commission report:
The cost of the wage gap to women is staggering. And the sacrifice is not in aid of any demonstrably justifiable social goal. To argue, as some have, that we cannot afford the cost of equal pay to women is to imply that women somehow have a duty to be paid less until other financial priorities are accommodated. This reasoning is specious and it is based on an unacceptable premise that the acceptance of arbitrary distinctions based on gender is a legitimate basis for imposing negative consequences … 116
While she didn't make specific reference to section 28 of the Charter, Abella J. effectively considered whether the government's proposed justifications for the breach perpetuated systemic discrimination. She found that they did. The government argued that it reduced employers' pay equity maintenance obligations because it sought to encourage increased employer compliance with the law in a context where less than half of employers have complied with their obligations. Abella J. voiced reservations about the government's alleged purpose and whether its chosen method was rationally connected to that purpose, then concluded that "the justification starts to melt away at the minimal impairment stage", particularly as "[l]owering the bar in the hopes of compliance strikes me, in any event, as being inconsistent with respect for substantive equality." 117 In applying a clear gender lens, she concluded as follows on the final stage of the section 1 test:
The speculative suggestion that sacrificing that right [to pay equity] in the hope of encouraging the possibility of better compliance, does not outweigh the harm caused by the limitation.
Reducing employers' obligations in the hopes of encouraging compliance subordinates the substantive constitutional entitlement of women to be free from discrimination in compensation to the willingness of employers to comply with the law. It sends the policy message to employers that defiance of their legal obligations under the Act will be rewarded with a watering-down of those obligations. And it sends the message to female workers that it is they who must bear the financial burdens of employer reluctance. Any benefits of that approach are outweighed by its harmful impact on the very people whom this pay equity scheme was designed to help. 118
This gendered lens brings an integrity and consistency to the principles that inform the Charter analysis. This case takes a meaningful step forward in bringing a renewed critical perspective to section 1 and it lays the groundwork to explicitly incorporate and build on the full implications of section 28 for Charter jurisprudence.
Resistance to Substantive Equality: Re-fighting Old Battles
Even while Abella J.'s majority rulings made strides on substantive equality analysis, Côté J.'s dissenting reasons resuscitate arguments and techniques of reasoning that have been repeatedly rejected by the SCC. In this respect, the persistent instability at the root of equality jurisprudence does not reflect uncertainty or complexity in the law so much as a resistance to equality's operation as a means of redistributing power and rights. The dissenting reasons yield many more examples of these avoidance techniques, but four will suffice.
First, rather than following the uncontestable principle that Charter claims must be analyzed from the perspective of the claimant, the dissenting reasons proceed from the perspective of the government respondent. The dissent in Alliance begins by chastising the majority for holding the Quebec government to account under the Charter at all because Quebec has been a pioneer in the struggle against pay inequities in private sector enterprises in Canada … From this perspective, it is profoundly unfair to Quebec society to claim that these amendments are unconstitutional. 119
Then rather than examining the PEA's impact on the claimants, the dissent decries the possibility that liability could be imposed on the government based on the inflated premise that the PEA would "almost inevitably" be found disadvantageous if it fails to close the pay equity gap "perfectly". 120 In CSQ, the dissent begins with 24 paragraphs outlining the government's efforts and challenges in developing the PEA and its Second, despite giving lip service to the principle of substantive equality, the dissent actually employs a rigid formal equality analysis that takes place squarely within the four corners of the impugned Act. 121 This approach has been roundly rejected since 1989 on the basis that it would lead to a "mechanical and sterile" analysis that is disconnected from an understanding of the claimants' location "in the entire social, political and legal fabric of our society". 122 In CSQ, this is precisely what arose in the dissent. Côté J. noted that the disadvantageously affected group "consists mostly of women" but one could not, on that basis, conclude that the discrimination was based on sex: "to resolve this issue, we must go further and ask what the basis for this differential treatment is." In going further, the dissent held that the differential treatment arises not because of sex, but because of "the lack of male comparators in their employers' enterprises". 123 systemic sex discrimination, which produce the sex segregated labour market that devalues women's workclearly a discriminatory dynamic based on sex.
Third, the dissents disavow any potential government accountability for the discriminatory impacts experienced by the claimants on the basis that the government did not create the economic disadvantage; it pre-existed the PEA. The dissent takes the position that the government could only be found in violation of the Charter if its own actions made that pre-existing discrimination worse. This stance contradicts the longstanding principle that a claimant's pre-existing disadvantage and the dynamics of systemic discrimination which produced that disadvantage are a core part of the contextual analysis under section 15. 124 More insidiously the dissent's approach treats existing systemic discrimination as an acceptableor naturalbaseline that is immune from Charter scrutiny. Far from eradicating existing discrimination, the dissent's approach condones and preserves it.
Fourth, the dissent takes the position that the choice to adopt the pay equity audit process in the PEA was a political decision that is beyond the jurisdiction of the Court.
The dissent states categorically that this choice "belongs to the elected representatives of Quebecers and not to this Court." 125 The dissent raises the oft-heard and oft-rejected argument that if legislation intended to help disadvantaged groups was subject to Charter scrutiny it would discourage governments from addressing disadvantage. Abella J. in Alliance addresses the absurdity of the dissent's assertions as follows:
There is no evidence to support the in terrorem view advanced by my colleagues that finding a breach would have a "chilling effect" on legislatures. That amounts to an argument that requiring legislatures to comply with Charter standards would have such an effect. Speculative concerns about the potential for inducing statutory timidity on the part of legislatures has never, to date, been an accepted analytic tool for deciding whether the Constitution has been breached. Legislatures understand that they are bound by the Charter and that the public expects them to comply with it. The courts are facilitators in that enterprise, not bystanders. 126 No new ground is broken by the Court in rehearsing these battles. Each sortie essayed by the dissent and deflected by the majority has been attempted and rejected in the past. But in continuing to resist the principles and logic of substantive equality, the dissent's positioning seems to suggest that equality rights can somehow be achieved without any redistribution of rights, benefits and material well-being. This is impossible.
Meanwhile, the routine repetition of these oft-rejected arguments means that those who seek to claim section 15's protection must, with each new case, stand ready to defend the exact gains that have been won multiple times in the past. The federal PEA contains other red flags that, while not previously ruled unconstitutional, raise meaningful concerns about prejudicial impacts on equality rights.
The new Act's purpose clause makes the objective of achieving pay equity subject to "the diverse needs of employers". Contrary to Abella J.'s section 1 reasons in Alliance, this subordinates fundamental equality rights to employer-defined "needs" and also undercuts the existing broad right to equality in the CHRA. Canada's PEA contains sweeping powers by which Cabinet can make regulations to exempt "any employer, employee or position, or any class of employers, employees or positions, from the application of any provision of this Act" with or without conditions. 132 Other provisions in the Act actually reduce the scope of rights protection below what currently exists in the CHRA. 133 This contradicts the basic equality rights principle that legislative action to address equality must move the bar forward, not back. 134
These concerns are sufficiently serious that the Standing Senate Committee on National Finance took the unusual step of passing BIA No. 2 but appending observations specifically, and only, on the new PEA. Those observations state:
"Considering the concerns expressed by a certain number of witnesses, your committee calls for the Government of Canada to initiate a parliamentary review in six years' time at the latest" and suggested eight specific areas of concern to be examined. 135 Secondly, on the provincial front, the Attorney General for Ontario has adopted a litigation strategy that takes an aggressively narrow approach to the precedential value of the new SCC judgments and a formalist analysis that effectively ignores the SCC's systemic analysis.
Unionized nursing and service employees at 143 female-dominated nursing homes across Ontario sought to enforce pay equity maintenance using the external male comparators they originally used to achieve pay equity. Without access to the external comparators, they argued, workers in female-dominated workplace were denied equal benefit and protection of the maintenance provisions in the Ontario Pay Equity Act, 136 and denied a full remedy for discrimination, in violation of section 15 of the Charter. In essence, the Ontario case combines the two issues addressed in the SCC pay equity appeals: Were women in female-dominated workplaces denied the same pay equity maintenance rights granted to other women under the PEA? If so, does that violate section 15 of the Charter by discriminating on the basis of sex? In 2016, the Pay Equity Hearings Tribunal denied the Unions' applications for reasons that mirror those of the Quebec Superior Court in CSQ. The Tribunal found that while there was differential treatment under the PEA, the distinction did not discriminate because it was based on women's "locus of employment" in a female-dominated workplace, not "sex". 137 On judicial review, the government argued that reliance on CSQ was "misplaced and unhelpful" because the specific mechanics by which external comparators were identified for female-dominated workplaces differed in the provincial statutes and because the impugned effects arose from different distinguishing techniques (in Quebec through delay, in Ontario through denial of access to male comparators). 138 women's access to justice. As long as this governmental resistance persists, it will encourage and fuel judicial recalcitrance to abandon the familiar and repeatedly rejected legal arguments reflected in the SCC dissents. Until then, we'll be walking in circles.
138 Factum of the Attorney General of Ontario, Participating Nursing Homes, supra note 13 at para. 68, 76 139 Factum of the Attorney General of Ontario, Participating Nursing Homes, supra note 13 at para. 95-98 140 Factum of the Attorney General of Ontario, Participating Nursing Homes, supra note 13 at para. 101
